control on the rea, Malaysia, cusing on the vernance. Our e firms in our mily-controlled firms. Our findings suggest that the mechanism in East Asian countries, which is mooth reallocation of money among investment projects through the internal capital markets of family-controlled group firms, does not work ancing from external capital markets, it may lead to strict internal financing constraints on investment. In this paper, we analyze in quantitative terms the influence of family pattern of corporate investment, using firm-level data from Indonesia, Ko the Philippines, and Thailand to regress the investment function and fo family ownership structure that characterizes East Asian corporate go results present evidence that family-controlled firms, the majority of th data set, face more severe internal financing constraints than non-fa commonly assumed to permit s well, and that, coupled with the difficulty of obtaining fin JEL classificat
Introduction
The East Asia region, while recording remarkable economic growth over experienced a serious financial crisis in 1997. In the wake of the crisis, there was some kind of relationship between the structure of corporate the long term, the view that governance in East Asia and spread of the crisis served to popularize research on corporate governance.
suggests that this type of reholders and entrepreneurs is less of a problem than conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. In such case, it is argued that there is a strong at would have egative image.
industrialize, led the development of Japanese industry. Even from the viewpoint of corporate governance, Zaibatsu headquarters had efficiently monitored subsidiaries, ermore, bank system yed a role in promoting investment in Keiretsu firms.
Our study is based on two hypotheses, one positive and one negative, regarding family-controlled firms, and quantitatively analyzes the influence of family control on the pattern of corporate investment using firm-level data from Indonesia, Korea, A large amount of research regarding East Asian corporate governance many firms in East Asia are actually dominated by specific families. In family ownership structure, consistency of interest between sha possibility that the controlling shareholder may expropriate profits th otherwise gone to outside investors.
Previously, family-controlled conglomerates did not have an entirely n On the contrary, it is accepted that the pre-war Zaibatsu, through their strong drive to while, based on this monitoring, functioning as their main source of funds. Furth it is the common consensus that Keiretsu, which centered on the main after the breakup of the Zaibatsu after the Second World War, pla Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to regress the capital investmen this end, we first classify the sample data into family-controlle nonfamily-controlled firms (independent firms), and then divide the sam pre-crisis and post-crisis. By comparing these two groups between two p t function. To d firms and ple period into eriods, we find that family-controlled firms faced more severe internal financing constraints than did nonfamily-controlled firms.
stitutions and in achieving rnal financing constraints. In fact, one can argue that nonfamily-controlled firms positively pushed forward capital markets and bank financing and that, by virtue of these investments, traints were released to a relatively high degree.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the corporate governance in empirical analysis based on investment function, Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
Corporate Governance in East Asia
Principle-agent theory arises in a business management context associated with behavioral studies of employer-contractor or employer-employee interactions, but it can be applied to public and non-profit settings as well. The central dilemma investigated by present principal-agent theory is how to get the employee or manager (the agent) to This result suggests that it is difficult to state that the financial in central firms within family-controlled affiliated firms were effective smooth financing of investment in the conglomerate and alleviating inte internal financing cons East Asia, Section 3 performs
Agency Problems throughout Firm Organization
票婢愀 漀 Ĩ3鍨 愀 act in the best interests of the employer or shareholder (the principal) w has an hen the agent informational advantage over the principal and has different interests from the refers to the difficulties the shareholder has in assuring that the entrepreneur is giving his best effort, rather than shirking or perking to maximize his own benefits.
rinciple-agent governance is the potential agency problem between shareholders and entrepreneurs, and deal with the mechanism to ensure that managers act in the best interest of shareholders. out the agent relationship between shareholders and entrepreneurs, is a presupposition of the case of dispersed ownership of corporate stock according to comparative multiple shareholders, , even on of firms by La Porta, et al. (1999) is the first research to reveal this fact. They focus on the ownership structure of 700 firms in 27 countries worldwide, identify the ultimate shareholders of firms, and accordingly classify firms into 6 groups: widely held firms which actually have no controlling shareholder, family controlled firms, state owned principal.
In the case of an agency problem between shareholder and manager, it From the social standpoint, the typical agency cost derived from p relationship is inefficient resource waste. The main objective of corporate to alleviate
Family Controlled Firms
Originally, the corporate governance problem, which occurs through as can typically be seen in large firms in Japan and the United States. However in large firms worldwide, concentrated ownership and actual dominati specific families are extensive.
票婢愀 漀 Ĩ4鍨 愀 firms, widely held financial institution owned firms, widely held non-financial rcent. Table 1 at owns more than 20 percent stock in the United Kingdom, all 20 firms are widely held, and even in the U.S. and Japan, the overwhelmingly majority of firms are widely held.
while in Hong half of firms are family-controlled.
Looking at the total of 27 countries, family-controlled firms account for a substantial 30 percent, similar to the figure for widely held firms (36 percent). 3 ship structure is of ownership structure of East Asian firms. They study 3000 publicly traded companies in 9 countries d they succeed in majority in the in terms of market e from 64 percent in Thailand to 96 percent in Singapore, and 1 Refers to firms, nonprofit organizations, employee-holding firms which are controlled by pension funds, mutual funds, and voting-trust certificate. 2 Refers to the largest 20 firms in each country in terms of market capitalization of common stock at the end of 1995. 3 They focus on middle scale firms, and find that among 27 countries, 45% of firms are family-controlled firms, which largely exceed dispersed firms (24%). 4 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) define cross-holding differently from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) . The former classifies it as dispersed firms, whereas the latter classifies it according to subject of cross-holding. corporation owned firms, and miscellaneous. 1 They focus on large firms 2 with minimum held ownership of 20 pe shows the result; it presents that there is no firm with a shareholder th On the other hand, all sample firms are family-controlled in Mexico, Kong, Argentina, Belgium, Greece and Israel, at least
Family Dominance in East Asian Firm
La Porta, et al. (1999) triggered research relating to corporate owner worldwide. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) focus on detailed analys and regions in East Asia, based on information at that time, 1996. An identifying ultimate controlling owners. 4 Their sample firms occupy the 9 regions in terms of the number of listed companies. Furthermore capitalization, they rang 票婢愀 漀 Ĩ5鍨 愀 they largely reflect the characteristics of listed firms in this region. Table 2 presents the results. In Japan, widely held firms occupy 80 p firms compared to 10 percent family controlled. Originally, in the East Asi the view of ownership structure, Japanese firms were seen as outsid ercent of total a region, from ers. To put it another way, in regions and countries outside of Japan, family-controlled firms account for the largest proportion of the five groups -over 70 percent for Indonesia and over 50 percent in most cases. As shown above, in the East Asian region, excluding Japan, ms is prevalent. In the case of designing so-called business groups under family control of many companies, it is fairly popular for each company to be connected through the use of -shareholdings
In the context of this complicated ownership structure, it is not possible to find who 5 Khanthavit, Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2004) research non-financial firms in Thailand, and Anuchitworawong, Souma and Wiwattanakantang (2003) analyze the corporate controlling structure, focusing on financial institutions in Thailand. 6 Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) demonstrate that 39% of all sample firms have pyramiding ownership structure, and 10% of all sample firms have cross-holding ownership structure. family ownership of listed fir As stated above, family-controlled firms are firms controlled by a specif not rare for a family to become many cases in which those firms become large shareholders of many o called sub-subsidiaries). In situation like that, we can recognize that the family is the pyramid ownership structure. In addition, there are cases of cross between group companies. 6 shareholders. Regarding East Asian firms, this theory does not hold. In the case of family ownership firms, the families hold essential control over firms, and, in most cases, they also appoint managers with interests that coincide with theirs. Therefore, 7 Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) present that in East Asian sample firms, voting rights exceed cash flow rights generally by 10 percent to 20 percent, and the majority are firms without disparity of voting rights and cash flow rights.
pyramid ownership structure and bringing out ultimate ownership struct There is another important side to this family ownership structure, t To examine this hypothesis empirically, they focus on the price movements of currency exchange and stock market in 25 emerging countries from 1997 to 1998. They rights held by controlling shareholders increase. ownership structure. Although, this correlation depends on which position in the pyramid chain the firm n is lower than n of this result is that risk-sharing across affiliated-firms in East Asia did not function well, as the controlling shareholders tunnel the profits in their best interest, resulting in profits of firms in the lower pyramid chain being siphoned to ones in the upper chain.
We continue by looking at some empirical research on the relationship between ownership concentration by family control and the Asian crisis. Lemmon and Lins (2003) study the effect of ownership structure on firm value during the East Asian 8 The indices used in this study are judicial efficiency, corruption, rule of law, enforceable minority shareholder rights, anti-directors rights, creditor rights, accounting standards at the time, 1990, most of which draw on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). currency depreciation and stock market decline of emerging markets dur financial distress between independent firms and firms belonging structure, and finds no significant difference between these two group with sufficient investor protection; however, the stock's market value is h belongs; if it is in the bottom of the chain, conversely, the market valuatio the independent firm. (2002) investigates the correlation between ownership concentration and corporate performance during the crisis, using the ratio of controlling shareholder's cash-flow rights to total cash-flow rights as a measure of ownership concentration, and finds that raising the controlling shareholder's cash-flow rights ratio by 10% increases per share earning ratio by 2.6%. Different from Lemmon and Lins (2003) , his findings support the view that controlling shareholder plays an active and positive role in corporate governance. He interprets this result as without involvement in management, the controlling shareholder does not necessarily have a conflict of interest with the minority shareholder, in fact the controlling shareholder has a strong incentive to monitor the management, thereby avoiding expropriation by management.
controlling the firm.
Using detailed ownership data from over 800 firms in eight East As crisis period, and Tobin's Q ratios of those firms in which managers control over the firms declined twenty percent more than Q ratios in othe the crisis period. This evidence indicates that the crisis deteriorates t They exerted considerable influence in Japanese industry from the Meiji era to the Second World War. The evaluation on those feudal family-controlled firms is controversial; however, Morikawa (1980) and Kikkawa (1996) indicate that there is consensus that Zaibatsu firms had strong industrialization will and led industry process of public investment and expenditure.
These family-controlled firms are able to increase their profit-earning these firms can secure its power base. The interdependence structure of t government can be interpreted as indicative of high incentive for both sid
The interdependence structure of these firms 2.9 Growth Promoting Effect of Family-Controlled Firms' System It has been argued that the cooperative or integrated policy decisi of government and corporate sector is one of the institutional underp contribute to achievement of the miraculous economic development in Ea There existed a large number of family-controlled firms in Japan, i.e., Z
Moreover, there are positive effects of Zaibatsu even from the view governance. For instance, Okazaki (1997 Okazaki ( , 1999 policies of GHQ after Japan's surrender. During the process, equity held by Zaibatsu families and 10 Okazaki (1997, 1999) adduces some examples as proof of the efficient monitoring mechanism by Zaibatsu headquarter such as: dispatch of board members of affiliated firms by Zaibatsu headquarter, ex ante report regarding important issues to Zaibatsu headquarter by affiliated firms, authority by Zaibatsu headquarter to shuffle personnel of key posts of affiliated firms. 11 While agreeing with Okazaki (1997 Okazaki ( , 1999 , Miyajima (2004) also indicates some costs of Zaibatsu, that the Zaibatsu family is risk averse and has a strong preference of maintaining feudal ownership, therefore the investment in affiliated firms is largely constrained by their liquidity and leverage.
were employed and a managers' monitoring system, which relied on i divisions and holding companies within the organization, became more im economic anarchy after crisis, and analyze the background. They argue th investor protection legal system, propping and L externally negative shock is not so large t
Investment Promoting Effect of Keiretsu Firms
The Zaibatsu were promptly dismantled as one part of the occupation Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) focus on these Keiretsu firms, and Kashyap and tressed firms, ressed firms. 13 They find that Keiretsu-member firms and higher ratio of loans from their biggest financing banks are associated with the higher level of investment in the immediate d main bank and effects of ent.
They classify manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange into independent firms and Keiretsu firms, estimate Tobin's Q investment function for these two groups, s. They argue iretsu finance, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) demonstrate that groups of affiliated firms promoted investment not only in peacetime but also in Japan's postwar period of 12 Teranishi (2003) indicates that cross-holding within Zaibatsu firms was widespread from the 1930s. 13 They define these firms as financially distressed firms if the interest coverage ratio (Business Income/Interest Paid) drops continuously below 1 for 2 periods. All sample firms are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Market.
analyze them quantitively from a view of corporate finance. Hoshi, Scharfstein (1990) investigate the relationship among financially dis Keiretsu and main bank, using investment data from 125 financially dist aftermath of a crisis. They interpret these results as the Keiretsu an system lower the cost of financial distress.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) analyze the significance Keiretsu firms from the perspective of internal financing constraints on investm and find independent firms face more severe internal financing constrain that in the case of Keiretsu firms, as the bank is the core element of Ke Keiretsu firms can avoid internal financing constraints. Given the present circumstances, these two assumptions should not be absolutely vers the East nly applies to e Second World War. Secondly, the former estimates the ce; the latter measures the investment function. Direct comparability is impossible because analysis objective and means are different. research that the relationship between these two assumptions remains insufficient. In this paper, we focus on measuring the investment function with firm-level data for East Asian firms. We aim to illustrate the economic significance of corporate governance symbolized by family dominance in East Asia, and to test which assumption is supported.
Relating to corporate governance symbolized by family-controlled firms, assumptions. One emphasizes the negative e expropriating outside investors; the other highlights the positive effects of p contrasting. In the first place, the former view pertains to a study that co Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) is the first study to formulate this idea and analyze empirically the correlation between funds constraints and investment. They find that the cost of funds varies according to the kind, and firms finance their investments sequentially from cheaper ones, which they define as Financing Hierarchies". It is argued that cash flow, regarded as the cheapest funds, definitely affects the level of investment. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) investigate empirically Japanese firms based on the same approach, and show that compared with independent firms, Keiretsu firms have lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow.
We collect financial data from Worldscope for all non-financial firms fr Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand from 1994 to 2000. T The basic model we estimate is:
I＝F（ROA, R, CASH, DEBT, K） in which, I indicates investment; ROA, return on total assets; R, intere theory.
Cash-flow conception is used when we take into account the financing imperfect finance market; that is, as M&M theory suggests, investment i of financing methods if the cost of using cash-flow is the same as that of e financing methods. That suggests that different scales of investme firms with abundant cash-flow and those without. 15 We link this a corporate governance factor to investigate the correlation between corpor 票婢愀 漀 Ĩ15鍨 愀 between cash-flow and investment.
Moreover, we include debt ratio into the model to control the cred argued that a high debt ratio raises the credit risk, and makes it difficu access external finance and, therefore, may constrain the investment. C it risk. 16 It is lt for firms to apital stock is taken to represent the scale of firms, since large-scale firms tend to invest in a high level based on the depreciation concept.
We estimate the following regression models based on the basic model:
lized by K in formula (1). All variables used in this d assets come/fixed assets R: interest expense on Debt/ all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations CASH: retained earnings + depreciation r, and operating income, interest expense, and cash-flow by GDP deflator. We control for industry and year effects in all estimations (based on 2-digit SIC code), country dummy in some 16 Regarding debt ratio, there is a hypothesis that debt contract exerts disciplinary mechanisms on corporate management. Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1989 suggests firms with large amount of debt would manage more efficiently if creditors effectively monitor their debtors. And if efficient management promotes investment, we can expect a positive coefficient sign for debt ratio. But our findings show the sign is negative, which supports our hypothesis that debt ratio represents the credit risk.
Estimated Model

１
In which I and CASH are norma study are defined as follows:
I: the expense related to the fixe ROA: operating in DEBT: debt/total assets K: fixed assets
We normalize investment and fixed assets by investment deflato 票婢愀 漀 Ĩ16鍨 愀 estimations, and total assets denominated in US dollars 17 in some estima
We use the random effects model in our regression analysis, and, a abov tions.
s we describe e, our sample data is an unbalanced panel owing to different sample numbers by 17 We convert the domestic currencies into US dollars, using exchange rate at the end of each year. The unit of US dollars is billion.
18 Hanazaki and Thuy (2003) show the average debt ratio of large firms during the 1980s to 1990s is 61% for Japan, 52% for United States, and 56% for France. 19 We eliminate the outliers of our variables as follows: I/K＞300、ROA＞200、ROA＜-200、CASH/K ＞1000、CASH/K＜-500.
year.
pre-crisis refers to 19 however, post-crisis (i.e., post-crisis refers to 1998-2000) investment largely to 10 to 15 percent.
for Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia in 1998 on mean measure reflec in exacerbation.
Third, the debt ratio distributes from 20 percent to 50 percent both median measures, not necessarily higher than that f 3.4 Empirical Re shareholder is a family. By doing so, our sample data from those five countries consists of 70 percent of family-controlled firms and 30 percent independent firms, which again confirms the extensive pervasion of family control. 20 We are especially grateful to Joseph P. H. Fan for providing the ownership structure data used in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) .
high statistical significance suggest that the cost of external fun availability of internal funds has considerable Next, we analyze quantitatively the effects o symbolized by family control. To this end, we classify our samp family-controlled firms and independent firms, and compare the invest and Lang (2000). They define controlling shareholders at the 20% cuto direct and indirect voting rights. We dr family-controlled firms and independent firms based on whether or no In all specifications of both family-controlled firms and independent firms, the 00 demonstrate highly sis.
ashyap and Scharfstein (1991), this result suggests that family-controlled firms face more severe internal financing constraints of investment compared to independent firms.
As Table 5 shows, family-controlled firms invest more relative to less cash-flow, compared to independent firms, resulting in higher dependence of external of funds and a lower profit ratio and cash-flow ratio compared to independ indicator has a significant and positive effect on the investment in family-controlled firms group, but loses the significance in the independent firms group.
The picture of differences on internal funds constraints of investment appears more clearly by comparing the estimations between pre-crisis period and post-crisis period.
terms of significance and magnitude, while the former one is a little lower problems.
3.7 Comparison of Pre-crisis and Post-crisis outlined above, recent research has found evidence that corporate go explain not only cross-country differences in performance dur cross-firm differences in performance within countries.
We divide my sample period into pre-crisis and post-crisis, and estimates on cash-flow indicator variable are statistically s specifications. However, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for family-contr firms is bigger than that for independent firms. For post-crisis per sult indicates that decline of investment after crisis is largely determined by significant decrease of investment opportunities with deterioration of economic 4. Conclusion 22 We exclude Indonesia here, as it is difficult to estimate the real interest rate owing to the high inflation rate, especially, in 1998 when high inflation rate reached 75%.
And compared with pre-crisis period, after crisis the internal funds c relaxed for family-controlled firms, and released for independent firms. T opposed in spite of the anticipation that the internal funds constraints ar the median value of this ratio falls sharply compared with pre-crisis period with decline of cash-flow, investment decreases much more.
The reason pointed out is that the net profit ratio, which is the key det investment, declines largely after crisis. Figure 1 shows the trend of net p This re environment, rather than internal funds constraints. Lepez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) Note 2: the sample data are for the top 20 publicly traded corporations in terms of market capitalization valuation at the end of 1995 in each country, and classified into 6 categories accoding to the ultimate shareholder who holds at least 20% of voting (2000) Note 2: the sample data is collected as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible data. Controlling shareholders are defined at 20% cutoff. The number in parentheses is the ratio to all publicly traded corporations in that country. Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
